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Abstract 
Disgust motivates disease avoidance but it is unclear why it is also reported 
towards moral violations. Previous explanations have focused on identifying the type 
of violation specific to disgust. Here, we propose that people will express disgust 
towards any type of moral violation in order to communicate particular motives. 
Unlike anger, which can be seen as self-interested, disgust communicates a more 
disinterested, moral motivation. In two experiments we show that observers infer 
more moral motivation from an expression of disgust, and more self-interested 
motivation from anger. Two further experiments testing SDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQ expression 
decisions demonstrated that disgust is chosen more to show moral concern and anger 
is chosen to protest harm to RQH¶Vself-interest. By shifting focus to the interpersonal 
effects of emotion expressions, these findings offer a new perspective for 
understanding the role of disgust in morality. 
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Communicating Moral Motives: The Social Signalling Function of Disgust 
Research into disgust has investigated the elicitors that distinguish it from its 
fellow other-FRQGHPQLQJHPRWLRQVVXFKDVDQJHU,QOLQHZLWKGLVJXVW¶VUROHLQ
pathogen avoidance (Curtis, Aunger & Rabie, 2004; Oaten, Stevenson & Case, 2009), 
it has been argued that disgust arises when a moral violation includes contamination 
or transgressions of bodily norms, referred to as ³SXULW\´YLRODWLRQV+RUEHUJ2YHLV
Keltner & Cohen, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999; Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2013; Pizarro, Inbar & Helion, 2011). However, others maintain that disgust 
has a wider role in condemnation of acts not involving impurity, such as cheating or 
stealing (Cannon, Schnall & White, 2010; Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 
2009; Danovich & Bloom, 2009; Tybur, Lieberman & Griskevicius, 2009). For 
example, Cannon et al. showed facial electromyographic activation specific to disgust 
but not anger when participants read about unfairness. These kinds of findings have 
been explained by extension from pathogen-defence; that is, social rule violators are 
VHHQDV³FRQWDPLQDQWV´*UDKDP+DLGW	Nosek, 2009; Chapman & Anderson, 2013; 
Inbar & Pizarro, 2014; Zhong & House, 2014).  
Here, we propose that emotions do not only regulate individual behaviour, but 
also have a communication function in signalling social motivations to others. This 
derives from the behavioural ecology view of emotion expressions as signals of intent 
toward other individuals (Hinde, 1985; Fridlund, 1994), as well as  perspectives on 
the communicative and inter-personal functions of emotions (Fischer & Manstead, 
2008; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Hareli & Hess, 2012; Parkinson, 2005; Van Kleef, 2009).  
Specifically, we suggest that anger and disgust can be distinguished by what they 
communicate: Observers infer more self-interested motivation from anger but more 
moral motivation from disgust. Thus, people should express anger or disgust 
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depending on whether they seek to communicate moral or self-interested motivation. 
From this perspective, disgust is not just an expression of an inner reaction to 
impurity, but a signal which advertises a moral position.  
A complementary perspective on moral disgust was presented by Tybur, 
Lieberman, Kurzban & DeScioli, (2013). They suggested that disgust functions as a 
signal to recruit observers of the expression to help condemn and punish the violator 
of a rule that the expresser favours. Here we do not test whether disgust effectively 
inspires collaborative behaviour but, based on the assumption that people can be 
motivated to communicate their moral position whether or not they expect to 
LQIOXHQFHREVHUYHUV¶EHKDYLRXUZHWHVWDFRPSDWLEOHK\SRWKHVLV: That the decision to 
express disgust versus anger depends on the motives the expresser seeks to 
communicate. 
Anger Protects Direct Self-interest  
Anger arises when a person perceives their interests to be harmed (Frijda, 
1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Kuppens et al., 2003). An expression of anger 
communicates the intention to approach and aggress, and that the recipient of anger 
should make concessions (Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004), discouraging 
future transgressions towards the expresser (Sell, Tooby & Cosmides, 2009).  
However, a person who expressed anger too readily could suffer social and 
reputational damage. Anger can lead another person to exclude or distrust the 
expresser (Van Beest, Van Kleef & Dijk, 2008; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Due to 
these potential costs, anger should only be deployed when violations that have clear, 
countervailing costs to the individual. Purely moral concerns that transcend an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-interest would fail this cost-benefit logic of anger.  
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Accordingly, although anger can be aroused by moral concerns like injustice, 
it is more consistently aroused by selfish concerns such as goal blockage (Hutcherson 
& Gross, 2011; Kuppens, 2003). Thus, observers are likely to infer that anger is 
motivated by self-interest, especially in socially ambiguous situations; hence a 
different emotional expression might be more useful to signal unselfish moral 
concern. 
Does disgust communicate disinterested condemnation? 
Disgust does not prepare aggressive action in the way that anger does 
(Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), so it may be appraised as less self-serving. 
Furthermore, because things are usually disgusting by general consensus, at least 
within a cultural group (e.g. foods, sexual acts), an observer of a disgust expression 
would appraise, not so much that a selfish goal has been blocked, but that a 
consensually offensive stimulus has been encountered. These features underlie our 
prediction that, in contrast to anger, people will infer disgust expressions to be 
motivated more by moral concern than by self-interest. And if expressers also have 
implicit knowledge that observers make motive inferences from expressions, they 
should strategically express anger and disgust to communicate these motives. 
Present Research. 
Experiments 1 and 2 presented a scenario in which a target expresses either 
anger or disgust towards a wrongdoing and SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ inferences about the target¶V 
moral versus self-interested motivation were measured.  
In Experiment 3, we gave participants a scenario in which their aim was either 
to communicate self-interest or moral concern and measured which emotion they 
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chose to express. For a stringent test, Experiment 4 used a concrete scenario involving 
harm to the self, to see whether the aim of communicating moral motivation would 
increase disgust expression under conditions that would normally predict anger 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). We report all measures, all manipulations, data 
exclusions, and a priori sample size rationale. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 were 
preregistered1, including all hypotheses described. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Based on an effect size (d = .91) in similar research on emotion 
communication (Hareli & Hess, 2010), a power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.2., 
recommended a sample size of 66 at 95% power. This was increased by 25% to allow 
for incomplete responses and exclusions based on an attention check question. 
Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 84 (34 female) participants from the United States 
(Mage =36.18, SD = 11.11). Due to an error, allocation to anger and disgust conditions 
was not evenly balanced, resulting in 34 participants in the anger condition and 50 in 
the disgust condition. 
Materials and procedure.  
Scenario. The participant imagines seeing a colleague expressing either 
disgust or anger in response to a violation. Minimal information about the violation 
was given, to ensure that participants made inferences based on the emotion expressed 
and not on other clues about the situation. Ambiguous social situations have also been 
used in previous research to investigate inferences based on expressed emotion, rather 
                                                             
1 Preregistrations and data can be found on the OSF website, https://osf.io/4ac5p/ 
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than the situation (VanDoorne, et al, 2015).The scenario consisted of the following 
text (word changes for the disgust condition in brackets): 
³<RXDUHDWZRUNLQDMREWKDW\RXKDYHRQO\MXVWVWDUWHGDQG\RXDUH
sitting in the breakroom during your break. Two of your colleagues 
come into the room and sit at the table at the other end of the room. 
After a few minutes you overhear one of your colleagues talking and, 
although you do not know her well, you recognize the voice as 
belonging to your colleague Mary. 
You can't hear all of the conversation from where you are but from 
what you hear, you can tell that they are talking about someone else 
who has done something wrong. <RXFDQWHOOIURP0DU\¶V voice that 
she sounds angry (disgusted). A minute later, you over-hear the words 
"I am angry (disgusted)". You decide to glance up at her and when you 
see her face, you can tell from her expression of anger (disgust) that her 
IHHOLQJVDUHVWURQJ´ 
Participants were then asked to complete several dependent measures.  
 
Perceived victim. Participants were asked to infer who was likely to be the 
victim of the wrongdoing from the following RSWLRQVµMary¶µ0DU\¶VfULHQG¶RU
µVRPHRQHHOVH0DU\GRHVQ¶WNQRZYHU\well¶ 
Perceived Motives. Participants were DVNHG³Based on what you saw and 
heard, why do you think Mary feels this way about whatever has happened? How 
likely are the IROORZLQJWREHWUXH"´Nine items were rated on a scale from 0, µnot at 
all likely¶, to 6, µYHU\OLNHO\¶ assessing how selfish, other-caring and moral the 
Comment [T1]: Moved to 
supplemental appendix 
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WDUJHW¶VPRWLYHV were perceived to be. The selfish items were: µVhe is mainly 
FRQFHUQHGDERXWKHUVHOI¶µVhe is concerned about how something has affected herself¶
DQGµVhe feels that she has been wronJHG¶(Į = .83). The other-caring items wereµVKH
LVFRQFHUQHGDERXWVRPHWKLQJEDGKDSSHQLQJWRVRPHRQHHOVH¶µVKH is worried 
VRPHRQHHOVH¶VIHHOLQJVPLJKWEHKXUW¶DQGµVKH feels this way on behalf of someone 
HOVH¶ (Į = .85). The moral concern items wereµVKH mainly feels this way out of 
principle¶µVhe IHHOVWKDWVRPHWKLQJLPPRUDOKDVKDSSHQHG¶DQGµVKH feels this way 
EHFDXVHLWLVDOZD\VZURQJWRFKHDW¶+RZHYHUWKHVHLWHPVKDGLQDGHTXDWHUHOLDELOLW\
(Į = .25). Since the second item was the only one that was unambiguously about the 
WDUJHW¶VPRUDOFRncern, the other two items were dropped. 
Results 
Four participants were excluded from analysis because they incorrectly 
identified the emotion expressed by the target. Where data violated sphericity, 
adjusted values are reported. 
Perceived victim. Figure 1 shows the perceived victim when the target 
expressed anger versus disgust. There was a significant association between the 
WDUJHW¶VHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGYLFWLPȤ2 (2, N = 80) = 14.39, p < .001, 
&UDPpU¶VV = .42. The target herself was perceived to be the victim more frequently 
when expressing anger than disgust, Ȥ2(1, N = 50) = 5.33,  p = .02, &RKHQ¶V w = .33. 
7KHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGZDVSHUFHLYHGWREHWKHWDUJHWPRUHIUHTXHQWO\ZKHQthe target 
expressed disgust compared to anger, Ȥ2(1, N = 19) = 6.88,  p > .001, &RKHQ¶V w = 
.60. A stranger was also perceived to be the target more frequently when the target 
expressed disgust compared to anger but this difference was not significant, Ȥ2(1, N = 
11) = 2.18,  p = .14, &RKHQ¶V w = .45.  
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Figure 1. Frequency of inferences made by participants about whether the victim of 
WKHYLRODWLRQZDVWKHWDUJHWKHUVHOIWKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGRUDVWUDQJHUZKHQWKHWDUJHW
expressed anger versus disgust. 
Perceived Motives.  A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with emotion as a between subjects factor and perceived motive as a within subjects 
factor revealed a main effect of motive, F(1.33, 103.80) = 17.21, p < .001, Șp2 = .18, 
but no main effect of emotion,  F(1, 78) = .30, p = .59, Șp2 = .004.  A significant 
interaction was revealed, F(1.33, 103.80) = 12.90, p < .001, Șp2 = .14. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, an expression of anger led participants to infer more self-interested 
motivation than disgust, F(1, 78) = 13.77, p < .001, Șp2  7KHWDUJHW¶VPRWLYHV
were rated as more other-caring when disgust was expressed, F(1, 78) = 8.65, p = 
.004, Șp2 = .10, and as marginally more moral with disgust, F(1,78) = 3.56, p < .063, 
Șp2 = .044. 
 
Figure 1. Motives inferred by participants when the target expressed anger versus 
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In summary, participants inferred that an expression of disgust was motivated 
more by moral and other-concern and that anger was motivated more by self-interest2. 
This is consistent with the finding that participants were more likely infer that the 
victim of a wrongdoing was the target themselves when the target expressed anger 
than when the target expressed disgust. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate findings from Experiment 1, including 
additional items for the measurement of moral concern, due to the low reliability of 
the scale in Experiment 1, and also varying the gender of the target. We also 
investigated whether inferences about the WDUJHW¶VPRWLYHVZHUHH[WHQGHGWR
judgements about their character, given findings that expressed emotions are 
sometimes seen as diagnostic of personality characteristics (e.g. Hareli & Hess, 2010). 
Since we did not find that inferred motives extended to character inferences, this 
information is included in the supplemental appendix. 
 Method 
Participants. Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 200 (72 female) participants 
from the United States (Mage =32.49, SD = 11.01). Expecting similar effect sizes to 
Experiment 1 (~d = .70), a power analysis (with desired power at .90) gave a 
recommended sample size of 176. We aimed to collect 200 participants to allow for 
exclusions based on an attention check question.  
Materials and Procedure.  
                                                             
2 Consistent with these findings, an additional dependent variable used in Experiments 1 and 2 
showed that participants were more likely infer that the victim of a wrongdoing was the target 
themselves when the target expressed anger and a stranger when the target expressed disgust. For 
details see online materials. 
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Scenario. The scenario was the same as in Experiment 1, except that the 
gender of the target was varied. The names Robert and Mary were used because in 
research by Cotton, 2¶1HLOO& Griffin (2008), they were rated equally American, 
Caucasian and likeable. Participants then completed the following dependent 
measures.  
Perceived Motives. PDUWLFLSDQWVDUHDVNHG³Based on what you saw and heard, 
why do you think Mary (Robert) feels this way about whatever has happened? How 
likely are the IROORZLQJWREHWUXH"´DQGUDWHGLWHPV from 0, µnot at all likely¶, to 6, 
µvery likely¶. Items measuring self-concern (Į = .74) and other concern (Į = .78) were 
the same as in Experiment 1. Items assessing moral motivation were divided into 3 
moral concern items and 3 principleddisinterested items. The moral concern items 
wereµVKH(he) WKLQNVVRPHRQHKDVEHKDYHGXQHWKLFDOO\¶µVKH (he) feels this way 
EHFDXVHVRPHRQH¶VEHKDYLRXUYLRODWHGDPRUDOSULQFLSOH¶DQGµVKH (he) feels this way 
because she (he) thinks important moral rules hDYHEHHQEURNHQ¶Į = .79). The 
principled items wereµVKH (he) would feel this way about what happened no matter 
ZKRZDVLQYROYHG¶µVKH (he) WKLQNVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGQ¶WHYHUEHKDYHOLNHWKDW¶DQG
µVKH (he) would feel this way about what KDSSHQHGZKRHYHUWKHYLFWLPZDV¶7KH
reliability of the principled items was unacceptable (Į = .56), so the second item was 
dropped and the remaining two items correlated well (r = .59). 
Trait inferences: Participants were DVNHG³Based on what you saw and heard, 
to what extent do you think that Mary (Robert) is likely to have the following 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV"´Items for three of the traits were from Leach, Ellemers & Barreto 
(2007). Perceived competence was assessed with 3 items: competent, intelligent and 
skilled (Į = .82). Warmth was assessed with 3 items: likeable, warm and friendly (Į = 
.90). Morality was assessed with 3 items: honest, sincere and trustworthy (Į = .83). 
Comment [T4]: Changed from 
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The dominance items: dominant, assertive and forceful (Į = .83) were from Anderson 
& Kilduff (2009). Participants also rated how masculine and feminine they perceive 
the target to be. To measure µQHJDWLYHDJJUHVVLRQ¶, 3 items were used: hostile, 
aggressive and out of control (Į = .81). All items were rated from 0, not at all, to 6, a 
lot like this. 
Results 
Sixteen participants were excluded because they incorrectly identified the 
emotion expressed by the target. 
Perceived victim. Figure 3 shows the perceived victim when the target 
expressed anger versus disgust. There was a significant association between the type 
of expression and the perceived victim of the wrongdoing, Ȥ2 (2, N =184) = 7.99, p = 
.02, &UDPpU¶VV = .21. A stranger was perceived to be the victim more frequently 
when disgust was expressed compared to anger, Ȥ2(1, N = 39) = 4.33,  p = .04, 
&RKHQ¶V w = .33.  7KHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGwas more frequently perceived to be the victim 
when the target expressed disgust compared to anger but this difference was not 
significant, Ȥ2(1, N = 29) = 0.86,  p = .35, &RKHQ¶V w = .17.  7KHWDUJHW¶VVHOIZDV
perceived to be the victim more frequently when expressing anger compared to 
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&RKHQ¶V w = .16. The pattern of results was similar irrespective of the gender of the 
target but effects were stronger for the male target, despite clear results for the female 
target in Experiment 1. Separate analyses for male and female target are shown in the 
supplemental appendix available online. 
Figure 3. Frequency of inferences made by participants about whether the victim of 
WKHYLRODWLRQZDVWKHWDUJHWWKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGRUDVWUDQJHUwhen the target 
expressed anger versus disgust. 
Perceived motives. An ANOVA with emotion expressed and gender of target as 
between subjects factors and perceived motives as a within subjects factor revealed a 
main effect of motive, F(2.55, 458.67) = 120.64, p < .001, Șp2 = .40, but no main 
effect of emotion expressed, F(1, 180) = 1.83, p = .18, Șp2 = .01, or gender of target, 
F(1, 180) = 0.12, p = .73, Șp2 = .00.  There was a significant 3 way interaction, F(2.55, 
458.67) = 3.89, p = .009, Șp2 = .021. Figure 2 shows mean ratings for each motive. 
Participants inferred more selfish motivation from anger, F(1, 180) = 32.26, p < .001, 
Șp2 = .15. They inferred more other-caring motivation from disgust, F(1, 180) = 3.97, 
p = .48, Șp2 = .02, as well as more moral, F(1, 180) = 7.49, p < .007, Șp2 = .04, and 
more principled, F(1, 180) = 22.89, p < .001, Șp2 = .11, motivation from disgust than 
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were stronger for the male target. Separate analyses for target genders are shown in 
the supplemental appendix available online. 
 
 
Figure 2. Motives inferred by participants when the target of the scenario was 
expressing anger versus disgust. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
compared to disgust, F(1, 180) = 32.26, p < .001, Șp2 = .15. They inferred more other-
caring motivation when disgust was expressed compared to anger, F(1, 180) = 3.97, p 
= .48, Șp2 = .02, as well as more moral, F(1, 180) = 7.49, p < .007, Șp2 = .04, and more 
disinterested, F(1, 180) = 22.89, p < .001, Șp2 = .11, motivation when disgust was 
expressed. The direction of results was similar for male and female target but effects 
were stronger for the male target. Separate analyses for male and female target are 
shown in the supplemental appendix available online. 
Figure 4. Motives inferred by participants when the target of the scenario was 
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Trait inferences. An ANOVA with emotion and gender of target as between 
subjects factors and trait inferences as a within subjects factor revealed a main effect 
of trait, F(1.76, 317.03) = 14.28, p < .001, Șp2 = .073, but main effects of emotion 
expressed, F(1, 180) = .79, p = .38, Șp2 = .004, and gender of expresser F(1,180) = 
.82, p = .37, Șp2 = .005, were not significant, nor were there any significant 
interactions. Only trait negative aggression significantly differed between emotion 
conditions, and only for the male target: it was higher when anger was expressed (M = 
4.35, 95% CIs [3.99, 4.71]) compared to disgust (M = 3.81, 95% CIs [3.45, 4.18]), 
F(1, 180) = 4.26, p = .04. Mean ratings for all inferred traits and correlations between 
inferred traits and inferred motives are shown in the supplemental appendix available 
online.  
Overall, Experiment 2 provided further evidence that disgust expressions 
communicate more moral and other-concerned motives compared to anger.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated whether people strategically deploy anger and disgust 
depending on the motives they aim to communicate. We predicted that participants 
would choose to express more disgust than anger to show moral concern, but more 
anger than disgust to show self-concern. We also varied whether the emotion was 
expressed towards a second party (the moral violator), or towards a third party 
audience. This explored the possibility that, in communicating with a second party, 
the value of anger in moral communication might increase, because of the possibility 
of changing behaviour directly. 
Method 
Comment [T6]: Move to 
supplemental 
DISGUST AS A SOCIAL SIGNAL  15 
 
Participants. Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 204 participants (82 female) 
from the United States (Mage = 35.75, SD = 12.36). Although Experiment 3 
investigated participants¶ own expression choices rather than inferHQFHVDERXWRWKHUV¶
expressions, similar effect sizes were expected (~d = .70). A power analysis with 
desired power at .90 recommended a sample size of 176 (as in Experiment 2). We 
aimed to collect 220 participants to allow for incomplete responses and exclusions 
based on an attention check question.  
Materials & Procedure.  
Scenario. Minimal information about the violation was given to ensure that 
participants chose an expression based on their communicative aim and not on other 
situational information. The scenario consisted of the following text (word changes 
for the harm-to-self condition  in brackets): 
 ³<RXDUHDWZRUNDQG\RXDUHVLWWLQJLQWKHEUHDNURRPGXULQJ\RXUOXQFK
break talking to your colleague, Mary. You are talking about another 
colleague you know called Robert, who has done something bad which you 
feel strongly about because it was immoral (harmed you). 
You are trying to get Mary to understand that you feel strongly about what 
Robert did because he broke an important moral principle (it harmed you 
personally)´ 
In the second party condition, participants imagined talking directly with the person 
who committed the violation (word changes for the harm-to-self condition are given 
in brackets): 
DISGUST AS A SOCIAL SIGNAL  16 
 
You are at work in the break room during your lunch break and you are 
talking to your colleague, Robert. Robert has done something bad which you 
feel strongly about because it was immoral (harmed you personally). 
You want to make sure that Robert understands that you feel strongly about 
what he did because he broke an important moral principle (it harmed you 
personally). 
Participants then completed several dependent measures: 
Emotion label. Participants were DVNHGµ:KLFKHPRWLRQZRXOG\RXEHPRVW
likely to express"¶DQGFKose IURPµDQJU\¶µGLVJXVWHG¶µDIUDLG¶DQGµMR\IXO¶ 
Emotion facial expression. Participants were DVNHGµ:KLFKRIWKHIDFLDO
H[SUHVVLRQVVKRZQEHORZZRXOG\RXEHPRVWOLNHO\WRVKRZ"¶Dnd chose from anger, 
fear, disgust and joy facial expressions. Images were obtained from the Radboud 
faces database (Langner et al., 2010). The expressions were portrait views from the 
first model in the database, a Caucasian adult female. 
Emotion label scale. Participants were DVNHGµ+RZPXFKRIHDFKHPRWLRQGR
you think you would express in this situation?¶DQGrated the four emotion labels from 
0, µnone¶ to 6, µa lot¶. 
Results 
Sixteen participants were excluded due to incomplete responses and 7 because 
they failed the attention check question. Analyses are conducted only for the emotions 
of interest, anger and disgust. 
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Emotion label. There was a significant association between communicative 
aim and emotion expression chosen, Ȥ2(1, N = 190)  = 43.44, p &UDPpU¶VV = 
.48. As shown in Figure 3, when participants¶DLPZDVWRVKRZPRUDOFRQFHUQWKH\ 
chose to express disgust more frequently than anger, Ȥ2(1, n = 96)  = 21.58, p < .001, 
&RKHQ¶V w = .47 EXWZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ aim was to show concern about harm to 
themselves, anger was chosen more frequently than disgust, Ȥ2(1, n = 94) = 22.03, p < 
.001, &RKHQ¶V w = .48. This pattern of results held across audience conditions: there 
was no significant difference between how often anger and disgust labels were chosen 
when communicating with a third party compared to a second partyȤ2(1, n = 190) = 
2.87, p  &UDPpU¶V9  
 
Figure 3. Percentage of choices made by participants between expressing anger or 
disgust, indicated by choice of emotion label and facial expression, when their aim 
was to communicate moral versus self-concern. Results are collapsed across third and 
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Emotion facial expression. As shown in Figure 3, there was a significant 
DVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQFRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPDQGFKRLFHRIIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQȤ2 (1, N = 
186) = 47.99, p < .001, &UDPpU¶V9  :KHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRVKRZPRUDO
concern, they chose disgust more frequently than angerȤ2 (1, n = 95) = 23.55, p < 
.001, &RKHQ¶V w = .50, but when their aim was to show concern about harm to 
themselves, they chose anger more than disgustȤ2 (1, n = 91) = 24.58, p < .001, 
&RKHQ¶V w = .52. There was no significant difference between how often anger and 
disgust facial expressions were chosen in the second and third party conditionsȤ2 (1, 
N = 186) = 1.50, p  &UDPpU¶V9 .  
Emotion scale.  An ANOVA with communication aim and audience as 
between-subjects factors and amount of emotion as a within-subjects variable 
revealed no main effects of emotion, F(1, 186) = 1.07, p = .30, Șp2 = .00, audience, 
F(1, 186) = 0.97, p = .33, Șp2 = .00, or communicative aim, F(1, 186) = 0.52, p = .47, 
Șp2 = .00. The two-way interaction between emotion and audience was not significant, 
F(1, 186) = 0.66, p = .42, Șp2 = .00, nor was there a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 186) = 0.39, p = .53, Șp2 = .00. However, there was a significant interaction 
beWZHHQWKHHPRWLRQFKRVHQDQGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPF(1, 186) = 
45.78, p < .001, Șp2 = .20. As can be seen in Figure 4, wKHQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDV
to communicate moral concern, significantly more disgust than anger was chosen, 
F(1, 186) = 16.64, p < .001, Șp2 = .08, EXWZKHQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWR
communicate self-concern, more anger than disgust was chosen, F(1, 186) = 30.06, p 
< .001, Șp2 = .14. 
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Figure 4. Amount of disgust and anger chosen by participants when their aim was to 
communicate moral concern versus self-concern, collapsed across third and second 
party conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
In summary, participants predominantly chose to express disgust, rather than 
anger, in order to communicate moral concern but they chose to express anger, rather 
than disgust to communicate that their own interests had been harmed. 
Experiment 4 
Hutcherson & Gross (Study 2, 2011) found that feelings of disgust are higher 
when the victim of a transgression is a stranger, while feelings of anger are higher 
when the victim is the self, and intermediate for a friend. Our scenario in Experiment 
3 did not specify whether the victim was the self or a stranger but only varied 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ communicative aim. As a more stringent test of whether the goal of 
communicating moral motives increases the likelihood of expressing disgust, 
Experiment 4 explicitly identified the self as the victim of a harm transgression, 
favouring feelings of anger.  However, we predicted that despite feeling anger, the 
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communicative aim was to show morally motivated condemnation. When their 
communicative aim was to protest harm-to-self, they would express anger.  
This design also enabled us to show whether our findings hold with a more 
concrete scenario and whether our predictions apply tothat was explicitly desscribed a 
harm violation. , contrary to accounts that argue for a specific link between disgust 
and impurity content in violations (e.g. Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). If so, this 
would provide one reason why disgust is sometimes expressed even to harm 
violations, which more usually evoke anger (see Chapman & Anderson, 2013, contra 
Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013): respondents may feel the need to communicate moral 
motivation.  
Method 
 Participants: Although Experiment 4 was similar in design to 
Experiment 3, ZHFRQVHUYDWLYHO\H[SHFWHGVPDOOWRPHGLXPHIIHFWVL]HVa&UDPpU¶V9
= .20) due to differences in design. A power analysis with desired power at .90 
recommended a sample size of 263. We aimed to collect 20% extra participants to 
allow for incomplete responses and exclusions based on an attention check question. 
From Amazon MTurk, 296 participants (156 female; Mage = 37.48, SD = 11.51) 
completed the study.  
 Materials and Procedure 
Scenario 
The first part of the scenario was the same for the 2 communicative aim conditions 
and the felt emotion comparison condition:  
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 ³$W\RXUSODFHRIZRUN\RXDQG\RXUFROOHDJXH5REHUWKDYHUHFHQWO\
completed a project that you have both been working on for the past few 
weeks. You were equal partners on the project. If anything, you feel that you 
worked a bit harder than Robert but you are pleased that the project was a 
success and you are happy to give him equal credit. 
However, you have just been told by another colleague that Robert presented 
the results of the project to the managers of the company. He made is sound 
as if he had done the majority of the work himself.  Since he was given 
almost all of the credit for the work, he was awarded a significant amount of 
money as a bonus. 
If your colleague had not told you about this, you might not even have found 
out. When you saw Robert UHFHQWO\KHGLGQRWPHQWLRQDQ\WKLQJDERXWLW´ 
In the comparison condition, to show that anger was the predominant felt 
emotion, the scenario ended here and participants answered questions about how 
they would feel. In the other conditions, the following text manipulated 
communicative aim (word changes for the harm-to-self condition are given in 
brackets): 
³A short while after you find out about what had happened, you are in the 
break room during your lunch break with your colleague Mary. 
You still feel strongly about what happened and you are trying to make it 
clear to Mary that you feel this way about what Robert did because he broke 
an important moral principle (harmed you personally). 
Which emotion would you be most likely to express to show that you feel 
strongly about what Robert did because it was immoral (harmed you 
SHUVRQDOO\"´ 
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Next, participants completed the following dependent measures: 
Emotion label. Participants were asked: µWhich emotion would you be most 
likely to express to show that you feel strongly about what Robert did because it was 
LPPRUDOKDUPHG\RXSHUVRQDOO\"´ Or in the felt emotion condition, µ:KLFKHPRWLRQ
ZRXOGEHVWGHVFULEHKRZ\RXZRXOGIHHOZKHQ\RXIRXQGRXWDERXWZKDW5REHUWGLG"¶ 
They chose from µDQJU\¶µGLVJXVWHG¶µDIUDLG¶DQGµMR\IXO¶ 
Emotion label scale. Participants were asked µHow likely would you be to 
express each emotion in this situation?¶RUµHow likely would you be to feel each 
emotion in this situation?¶and rated the four emotioQODEHOVIURPµQRWDWDOO¶ to 6, 
µGHILQLWHO\¶ 
Emotion facial expression. In the expressed emotion conditions, participants 
were DVNHGµ:KLFKRIWKHIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQVVKRZQEHORZZRXOG\RXEHPRVWOLNHO\
WRVKRZ"¶DQGFKRRVHIURPDQJHUIHDUGLVJXVWand joy expressions. 
Results 
Ten participants were excluded for failing the attention check question. Only 
the emotions of interest, anger and disgust, were analysed. 
Felt emotion. As expected, participants chose the label angry more frequently 
than the label disgusted to describe how they would feel, Ȥ2(1, N = 94)  = 24.51, p < 
.001, &RKHQ¶V w  = .51. Using the scaled responses, participants also reported that 
they would feel anger more than disgust, t(94) = 4.59, p < .001, d = 0.95. Figures 5 
and 6 display these results in comparison to the communicative goal conditions. 
Expressed emotion label. There was a significant association between 
communicative aim and HPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQFKRVHQȤ2(1, N = 191)  = 8.37, p = .004, 
&UDPpU¶V9 = .2. When participants were given the aim to communicate concern 
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about harm-to self, they chose angry more frequently than disgusted, Ȥ2(1, n = 93)  = 
20.82, p < .001, &RKHQ¶Vw = .4. When they aimed to communicate moral concern, 
there was no significant difference in how often they chose disgusted and angry, Ȥ2(1, 
n = 98)  = 0.5, p = .48, &RKHQ¶Vw = .071.    
 
Figure 5. Percentage of choices made by participants between anger or disgust, when 
their aim was to communicate moral versus self-concern, compared to describing the 
emotion they would feelCategorical anger/disgust choices by communication goal or 
felt emotion condition , Experiment 4. 
Expressed emotion facial expression. Similarly, there was a significant 
association between communicative aim and facial H[SUHVVLRQFKRVHQȤ2(1, N = 188)  
= 12.15, p < .001, &UDPpU¶V9 = .25. When participants were given the aim to 
communicate concern about harm-to self, they chose anger facial expression 
significantly more frequently than disgust, Ȥ2(1, n = 92)  = 28.28, p < .001, &RKHQ¶Vw 
= .55. When they aimed to communicate moral concern, there was no significant 
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Expressed emotion scale.  
An ANOVA with communication aim as a between-subjects factor and 
amount of emotion expressed as a within-subjects variable revealed a main effect of 
emotion expressed, F(1, 189) = 18.24, p < .001, Șp2 = .09, but the main effect of 
communicative aim was not significant, F(1, 189) = 0.00 p = .97, Șp2 = .00. The two-
way interaction between emotion expressed and communicative aim was significant, 
F(1, 189) = 18.24, p < .001, Șp2 = .09. As can be seen from Figure 6, when the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRFRPPXQicate self-concern, more anger than disgust was 
chosen, F(1, 197) = 35.55, p < .001, Șp2 = .16, but wKHQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWR
communicate moral concern, the amount of disgust was equal to the amount of anger 
expressed, F(1, 197) = .000, p = 1.00, Șp2 = .00. 
Figure 6. Amount of disgust and anger chosen by participants when their aim was to 
communicate moral concern or self-concern, compared to describing the emotion they 
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In confirmation of our previous findings, when participants aimed to 
communicate that their condemnation was morally motivated, the relative likelihood 
of expressing disgust increased to the extent that they were just as likely to express 
disgust as anger, despite the scenario primarily inducing feelings of anger. This 
finding demonstrates thatIntentions to express disgust does not just depend on what 
one feels, but also on what one aims to communicate, even if the violation has no 
impure content.3 
General Discussion 
These results show that an expression of disgust conveys more moral concern 
than a statement of anger (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, our results indicate that 
people deliberately choose to express disgust to communicate that they are motivated 
by moral concern, and anger to communicate that they are motivated by self-concern 
(Experiments 3 and 4). These results support our social signalling hypothesis of moral 
disgust.  
These findings suggest that if a person has a direct interest in changing another 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXU, they are likely to express anger, since this communicates an 
intention to act to address a wrongdoing that has affected the self (Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011). But if the wrongdoing does not directO\DIIHFWDSHUVRQ¶V interests, yet 
they still appraise it as wrong or objectionable, then they are more likely to express 
disgust since it more effectively communicates impartial, moral condemnation.  
This perspective may explain why people often report feeling disgust towards 
wrongdoings such as cheating or stealing, which have no cues of contamination: 
                                                             
3 Another preregistered study with a similar design was conducted and results were consistent 
with Experiment 4, though less clear-cut for the scale ratings. Due to space constraints, see 
supplemental materials for details.  
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Disgust is being used to communicate morally motivated condemnation. Even with 
actions that do involve purity violation, a question for future research is whether 
people respond with disgust predominantly because of an appraisal of contamination 
or impurity, or because they aim to communicate morally motivated condemnation. It 
could also be that the disgust expression is motivated by a combination of concerns; 
one might have an automatic disgust reaction towards a sexually deviant act but 
exaggerate the expression of disgust to PDNHFOHDURQH¶VPRUDOEDVLVIRUobjection.. 
As noted by Hinde (1985), the motives behind an emotion expression may lie 
somewhere on a continuum from purely expression of internal feeling, to purely 
strategic signalling.   
One limitation is that to have participants base their judgements only on the 
expression and not on situational cues, the scenarios were vague about the details of 
the violation. Future research may incorporate more contextual information to 
confirm whether disgust is used to signal moral concern towards different types of 
wrong doing, such as fairness, harm and loyalty violations. Previous research has 
demonstrated that observers make character inferences based on the emotion that a 
person expresses in a situation (e.g. Hareli & Hess, 2010), so the use of additional 
details about the violation may reveal that observers do make inferences about the 
moral character of a person who expresses disgust versus anger against a more 
complete situational backdrop, despite our null findings in Experiment 2. 
One question raised by the current research is how deeply communications of 
disgust reflect SHRSOH¶VVSRQWDQHRXVIHHOLQJV,I people report disgust or even produce 
an expression of disgust, this may not mean that they are experiencing the subjective 
feeling of disgust or its associated nausea, contamination and withdrawal components; 
rather, they may express it to convey information about their motives. This is 
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FRQVLVWHQWZLWK)ULGOXQG¶VYLHZRIWKHIXQFWLRQRf emotion expressions: They 
have adaptive value because they convey information about the behavioural intentions 
and social motives of the expresserQRWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHH[SUHVVHU¶VLQWHUQDO
feeling state. In the case of disgust towards wrong doings, it seems clear that 
communicating information about RQH¶s basis for disapproval of the behaviour has 
JUHDWHUDGDSWLYHYDOXHWKDQFRPPXQLFDWLQJRQH¶s feeling of literal or figurative 
contamination.  
Equally, it is more useful for an observer to acquire information about whether 
WKHH[SUHVVHU¶VPRWLYHVDUHPRUDO versus self-interested than it is to learn about their 
internal feelings of contamination. It is, after all, information about the social motives, 
disposition and behavioural intentions of the expresser that will enable the observer to 
adjust their own social behaviour accordingly: Through trust and cooperation given 
the disinterested, moral inclination of the disgust expresser, or through appeasement 
or retaliation given the personal stakes suggested by anger. Future research may 
investigate whether observers do, indeed, behave differently (more cooperatively) 
towards a person who has expressed disgust versus anger towards the same wrong-
doing. 
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